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In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  effect  of  contemporaneous 
borrower,  property,  and  loan  characteristics  on  the  default 
decision  of  a  sample  of  lower  income,  subsidized  rural  borrowers 
participating  in  the  Farmers  Home  Administration  Section  502 
program.  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  time  that  borrower 
related  panel  information  has  been  used  in  a  default  study. 
Contrary  to  prior  work,  contemporaneous  net  equity,  captured  by 
the  variable  loan  to  value  ratio,  was  found  to  have  no  effect  on 
default.  In  contrast,  mortgage  pa;Tr.ant  to  income  ratio  and  a 
number  of  borrower  related  factors  were  found  to  significantly 
affect  the  default  decision.  Overall,  the  study  findings  suggest 
that  the  main.aspect  of  the  FmHA  Section  502  program,  the 
interest  rate  subsidy,  minimizes  default  risk  for  the  average 
program  participant. Introduction 
A  better  understanding  of  the  mortgage  risks  posed  by 
borrower  and  loan  characteristics  is  key  to  extending  home 
ownership  opportunities  to  low  income  households.  When  mortgage 
risks  are  not  well  understood,  households  may  be  forced  to  pay 
mortgage  interest  rates  that  are  higher  than  necessary,  or 
mortgage  insurance  premiums  to  compensate  for  the  higher  risks 
that  lenders  perceive  them  to  represent.  In  extreme  situations, 
borrowers  may  be  denied  loans  -:Ltogether  because  they  have 
certain  characteristics,  or  are  residents  of  areas  considered 
risky,  regardless  of  their  individual  credit  worthiness. 
Given  that  lenders  minimize  default  risks  by  lending  to 
borrowers  they  consider  more  credit  worthy,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  most  empirical  studies  of  default  end  up  analyzing  the 
mortgage  payment  decisions  of  middle-  and  high-income  households 
who  represent  the  vast  majority  of  residential  mortgage 
borrowers.  Although  much  insight  has  been  gained  about  the 
default  decision  from  these  studies,  they  have  not  shed  much 
light  on  the  default  behavior  of  lower-income  mortgagors, 
subsidized  or  otherwise.  This  paper  addresses  this  issue  by 
examining  the  effects  of  borrower,  property,  and  loan 
characteristics  on  the  default  decisions  of  a  sample  of  lower 
income,  subsidized  borrowers  in  a cross-section  of  rural  housing 
markets  in  the  United  States. 2 
Previous  Research 
Most  contemporary  studies  of  mortgage  default  are  couched  in 
option  theory.'  This  theory  states  that  at  the  beginning  of 
each  payment  period,  borrowers  have  the  option  of  making  the 
payment  due,  of  paying  off  the  mortgage  balance  through  sale  of 
the  home  or  refinance  (prepayment),  or  of  exercising  the  option 
to  give  the  house  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for  extinguishing  the 
first  mortgage  lien  and  canceling  the  associated  debt  (default). 
In  aszassing  whether  or  not  to  exercise  the  dsfault  option,  a  so 
called  put  option,  borrowers  consider  the  market  value  of  the 
mortgage  and  the  equity  they  have  in  the  home,  which  is  a  crude 
measure  of  the  extent  to  which  the  put  option  is  "in  the  money" 
(Quigley  and  Van  Order  1991).*  From  this  perspective,  default 
is  seen  as  a  purely  financial  matter,  in  which  borrower 
characteristics  such  as  income  and  employment  status  do  not 
matter. 
Theoretically,  borrowers  will  exercise  the  default  option 
whenever  the  value  of  the  house  plus  any  costs  of  exercising  the 
option  falls  below  the  mortgage  value  (Foster  and  Van  Order 
1984).  However,  because  the  default  option  has  intrinsic  value 
and  the  current  value  of  the  mortgage  is  affected  by  the  option 
to  default  in  the  future,  some  borrowers  with  negative  equity  may 
not  default  because  they  would  forfeit  the  option  of  defaulting 
' See  Quercia  and  Stegman  (1992)  for  a  comprehensive  review 
of  the  residential  mortgage  default  literature. 
'For  a  discussion  of  options  in  the  financial  literature  see 
Simons  (1990,  pp.  82-86). 3 
later  (Epperson  et  al.  1985).  This  factor  makes  it  difficult  to 
compute  the  value  of  the  option. 
A  second  issue  that  makes  this  computation  complex  is  the 
problem  of  estimating  the  costs  of  exercising  the  default  option. 
Borrowers  are  assumed  to  consider  costs  such  as  transaction 
costs,  moving  costs,  and  the  value  of  the  borrower's  reputation 
and  credit  rating,  which  are  also  affected  by  default  (Quigley 
and  Van  Order  1991).  Once  these  issues  are  taken  into  account, 
t?.Ld  option  can  be  computed  in  a  purely  financial  way. 
However,  in  addition  to  these  issues  that  make  the 
computation  of  the  option  difficult,  crisis  events  and  other 
borrower  related  factors  can  be  said  to  affect  the  exercise  of 
the  default  option  too  (Vandell  and  Thibodeau  1985).  This  is 
because  crisis  events,  such  as  a  change  in  marital  status  or 
number  of  dependents,  may  trigger,  delay,  or  eliminate  the  need 
to  exercise  the  default  option  over  time.3 
The  importance  of  borrower  related-factors  and  transaction 
costs  in  the  default  decision,  however,  remains  open  to  debate. 
This  debate,  is  exemplified  by  the  works  of  Kau,  Keenan,  and  Kim 
(1991)  and  Quigley  and  Van  Order  (1992).  Kau,  Keenan,  and  Kim 
(1991)  have  solved  numerically  an  option-based  theoretical  model 
of  default  that  indicates  that  transaction  costs  play  little  or 
31n  fact,  Vandell  and  Thibodeau  (1985)  founds  that  borrower- 
related  variables,  such  as  self-employment  and  source  of  income 
from  commissions,  have  a  larger  effect  on  default  than 
traditional  financial  variables,  such  as  contemporaneous  net 
equity  and  the  difference  between  the  market  and  par  value  of  the 
mortgage. no  role  in  the  exercise  of  the  option;  therefore,  they  conclude 
that  the  option  is  exercised  ruthlessly.  From  this  perspective, 
non-financial  considerations  play  no  role  in  the  decision  to 
exercise  the  default  option.  Quigley  and  Van  Order  (1992), 
however,  have  identified  a  number  of  inconsistencies  between  the 
theoretical  premises  of  the  ruthless  model  and  observed  default 
behavior.  Quigley  and  Van  Order  suggest  that  reputation  costs 
(one  form  of  transaction  cost),  along  with  a  random  term  of  the 
mortgage,  can  lxplain  observed  default  behavior 
among  borrowers  with  nonassumable  mortgages  who 
move).  Quigley  and  Van  Order  did  not  test  this 
empirically. 
(for  :.*istance, 
want  or  have  to 
premise 
A  major  reason  for  this  ongoing  debate  has  been  a  lack  of 
adequate  panel  data  containing  relevant  borrower-related 
information.  Typically,  borrower  information  at  the  time  of 
default  has  been  estimated  from  borrower  information  that  was 
collected  at  the  time  of  loan  origination  through  the  use  of 
proxy  measures  and  multivariate  statistical  techniques. 
Unfortunately,  these  estimated  measures  may  not  reflect  the 
specific  circumstances  of  individual  borrowers  who  default,  thus 
resulting  in  conflicting  or  insignificant  findings.  Panel  data 
are  required  to  analyze  the  role  of  contemporaneous  borrower- 
related  factors,  as  well  as  property  and  loan  characteristics,  on 
default. 
In  contrast  to  prior  work,  the  present  study  is  based  on 
panel  information  on  874  participants  in  the  Section  502  Home 5 
Ownership  program  administered  by  the  Farmer's  Home 
Administration  (FmHA),  which  is  part  of  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture.  The  Section  502  program  is  available  to  residents 
of  rural  housing  markets. 
Rural  housing  markets 
The  housing  programs  administered  by  FmHA  are  available  in 
rural  housing  markets.4  Kravitz  and  Collings  (1986)  contend 
that  rur,?y_  housing  markets  are  characterized  by 
First,  they  are  characterized  by  a  typical  lack 
lending  system.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that, 
counterparts,  rural  areas  lack  large  population 
the  existence  of  mortgage  lending  viable. 
C..do  issues. 
of  a  mortgage 
unlike  urban 
bases  that  make 
Second,  rural  housing  markets  are  characterized  by  a 
disproportionate  number  of  households  living  in  poverty  and 
households  having  housing  problems.  For  instance,  while  less 
than  l/4  of  the  U.S.  population  lives  in  rural  areas,  more  than 
l/3  of  all  substandard  units  in  the  U.S.  are  located  in  these 
areas,  and  38  percent  of  these  units  are  occupied  by  households 
living  in  poverty  (Kravitz  and  Collings  1986). 
Compared  with  their  urban  counterparts,  rural  households 
living  in  poverty  present  three  distinct  characteristics.  First, 
poor  rural  households  are  more  likely  to  work  and  to  be  headed  by 
an  older  person  than  in  urban  areas.  For  instance,  while  three 
4  The  information  presented  in  this  section  is  from  Kravitz 
and  Collings  (1986). 6 
of  every  five  poor  rural  households  work,  only  two  of  every  five 
poor  urban  households  do.  Similarly,  while  one  in  every  five 
poor  rural  households  is  headed  by  a  person  age  65  and  older, 
only  one  in  every  ten  poor  urban  households  is  headed  by  such  a 
person  (Kravitz  and  Collings  1986). 
Second,  rural  households  also  exhibit  distinct  housing 
characteristics.  While  in  urban  areas,  for  every  two  poverty 
level  renters,  there  is  one  poor  home  owner,  the  exact  opposite 
is  the  case  in  rural  areas:  for  every  2  poverty  level  home  . 
owners  there  is  one  poor  renter  (Kravitz  and  Collings  1986). 
Thus,  unlike  their  urban  counterparts,  most  of  the  poor  rural 
households  are  home  owners.  Not  surprisingly,  rural  home  owners 
present  many  of  the  undesirable  housing  characteristics  commonly 
associated  with  poor  urban  renters.  Rural  home  owners  are  likely 
to  live  in  substandard  units,  with  deficiencies  such  as  a  lack  of 
complete  plumbing,  inadequate  heating,  and  dilapidation. 
Finally,  compared  with  their  urban  counterparts,  poor  rural 
households  are  also  less  likely  to  receive  public  assistance. 
While  more  than  one  in  every  three  poor  urban  households  receive 
public  assistance,  less  than  one  in  every  four  poor  rural 
households  do  so.  Similarly,  while  more  than  two  in  every  eight 
poor  urban  renters  live  in  public  housing  or  receives  government 
assistance  in  renting  a  privately  owned  unit,  only  a  little  over 7 
one  in  every  eight  poor  rural  renters  receives  such  assistance 
(Kravitz  and  Collings  1986).5 
. 
To  meet  the  particular  housing  needs  of  rural  households, 
FmHA  provides  assistance  in  rural  housing  markets.  Broadly 
defined,  assistance  is  provided  to  households  living  in  (1)  open 
country,  or  (2)  small  towns,  even  if  adjacent  to  densely  settled 
areas.  Small  towns  are  considered  eligible  if  they  have  less 
than  10,000  people  and  are  rural  in  character.  If  mortgage 
credit  is  unavailable,  towns  with  populations  between  10,000;  =:nd 
20,000,  that  are  not  contained  in  a  metropolitan  area,  are  also 
eligible. 
The  FmHA  Section  502  home  ownership  program 
The  Farmer's  Home  Administration  (FmHA)  Section  502  home 
ownership  program  provides  direct  loans  to  qualified  households 
for  the 
Section 
improve 
purchase  of  new  or  existing  single  family  homes.6  FmHA 
502  loans  can  also  be  used  to  build,  rehabilitate, 
or  relocate  a  dwelling  or  provide  related  facilities. 
The  terms  of  the  loan  are  for  33  years,  or  38  years  for  borrowers 
with  incomes  at  or  below  60  percent  of  area  median  income  (AMI) 
and  who  need  the  extra  term  to  show  payment  ability,  or  30  years 
for  loans  made  for  the  purchase  of  manufactured  homes. 
'More  precisely,  only  18  percent  of  all  rural  renters  living 
at  or  below  the  poverty  level  live  in  public  housing  or  receive 
government  assistance  in  renting  a  privately  owned  unit. 
6The  presentation  in  this  section  follows  Housing  Assistance 
Council  (HAC  1987). 8 
The  loans  have  an  interest  rate  (note  rate)  approximately 
equal  to  the  federal  costs  of  long-term  borrowing.  Although  the 
loans  have  a  fixed-note  rate,  the  actual  rates  paid  by  borrowers 
depend  upon  their  annual  income.  The  difference  between  the  note 
rate  and  the  interest  rate  actually  paid  by  borrowers  is  called 
the  interest  credit.  This  is  the  subsidy  provided  by  the 
program. 
The  effective  rate  on  a  Section  502  loan  is  set  so  that 
borrowers  spend  20  percent  of  their  adjusted  income  on  mortgage 
principal  and  interest  payments,  property  taxes,  and  homeowner's 
insurance.  Adjusted  income  is  estimated  by  subtracting  a  number 
of  authorized  deductions  from  a  borrower's  annual  income.  These 
adjustments  include  deductions  for  each  family  member  under  18 
years  of  age,  elderly,  disabled  or  full  time  student  residing  in 
the  household  (other  than  applicant,  spouse  or  co-applicant). 
Some  medical  expenses,  and  a  number  of  other  family  related 
deductions  are  also  authorized.  It  is  the  borrower's  adjusted 
income  that  is  used  in  the  computation  of  the  interest  credit. 
The  maximum  interest  credit  can  reduce  the  effective 
interest  rate  paid  by  borrowers  to  1  percent.  Borrowers  who 
initially  qualify  for  this  maximum  interest  credit  subsidy  must 
absorb  out-of-pocket  all  future  increases  in  property  taxes  and 
home  owners'  insurance.  Higher  income  borrowers  who  qualify  for 
a  smaller  interest  credit  at  the  time  of  loan  origination  can 
have  their  subsidy  increase  with  increases  in  taxes  and  insurance 
over  time,  until  they,  too,  qualify  for  the  maximum. 9 
The  interest  credit  is  calculated  as  the  lesser  of  either 
(1) the  difference  between  (a) the  total  annual  payment  of 
mortgage  principal'and  interest  at  note  rate,  insurance,  and 
property  taxes  and  (b)  20  percent  of  annual  adjusted  income; 
or  (2)  the  difference  between  (a) the  annual  payment  for 
principal  and  interest  at  note  rate,  and  (b) the  payment  of 
principal  and  interest  at  a  1 percent  interest  rate. 
Every  year,  the  interest  credit  is  revised  based  on  changes 
in  household  income.  Borrowers  inUSt  have  incomes  at  or  below  80 
percent  of  area  median  income  (AMI)  to  receive  an  interest  credit 
at  the  time  of  loan  origination.  Borrowers  continue  to  receive 
an  interest  credit  as  long  as  they  have  low  incomes.  As  income 
rises,  the  interest  credit  is  reduced.  The  phasing  out  is 
gradual,  up  to  the  point  where  household  income  reaches  a  certain 
threshold,  set  by  FmHA,  on  average,  at  $5,500  above  80  percent  of 
AMI.  At  this  point,  the  borrower  loses  the  interest  credit  and 
must  thereafter  pay  the  full  rate  at  which  the  mortgage  was 
originally  written.  Once  the  interest  credit  is  lost,  only  those 
borrowers  whose  incomes  fall  below  80  percent  of  AM1  again  become 
eligible  to  receive  the  interest  credit. 
Moderate  income  borrowers,  those  with  incomes  above  80 
percent  of  AM1  at  origination,  can  also  qualify  for  Section  502 
loans,  but  they  do  not  receive  any  interest  credit.  For  these 
borrowers,  the  interest  rate  remains  fixed  for  the  life  of  the 
mortgage. 10 
In  broad  terms,  termination  of  a  Section  502  loan  can  occur 
in  three  ways:  (1)  when  the  mortgage  is  refinanced;  (2)  when  the 
unit  is  sold  by  the  borrower  and  the  loan  is  prepaid:  and,  (3) 
when,  in  the  eventuality  of  mortgage  non-payment,  title  to  the 
property  is  transferred  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for 
extinguishing  the  mortgage  debt.  The  transfer  of  title  to  the 
lender  can  occur  in  three  ways:  (a)  through  foreclosure:  (b) 
through  transfer  of  the  deed  in  lieu  of  foreclosure:  and  (c) 
throuy't,  voluntary  conveyance.  In  all  three  c-.';es,  borrowers 
forego  their  claim  to  any  equity  in  the  property  in  exchange  for 
cancellation  of  the  outstanding  debt. 
The  FmHA'  Section  502  program  has  a  built  in  recapture 
provision.  When  dwellings  are  sold  or  loans  transferred,  any 
unpaid  principal  and  interest  due  at  note  rate  are  disbursed  to 
FmHA.  At  this  time,  borrowers  also  receive  an  amount  equal  to 
their  original  equity.  The  remaining  balance,  if  any,  is  called 
value  appreciation.  A  share  of  this  value  appreciation  is 
received  by  FmHA  as  repayment  for  the  subsidy  granted.  FmHA's 
share  varies  by  length  of  residence  and  the  average  effective 
interest  rate  paid  by  borrowers  over  the  holding  period.  The 
recapture  estimation  is  structured  so  that  borrowers  receive  the 
largest  share  of  any  value  appreciation. 
There  is  an  important  variation  to  the  basic  Section  502 
program.  Groups  of  families  that  are  unable  to  build  or  acquire 
adequate  homes  due  to  their  low  incomes  can  participate  in  mutual 
self  help  housing  projects,  which  are  sponsored  usually  by 11 
nonprofit  organizations.  Typically,  6  to  12  eligible  families 
help  each  other  build  their  homes  under  qualified  supervision. 
The  resulting  reduction  in  labor  costs  allows  otherwise 
ineligible  families  to  own  their  homes.  Loans  are  made  available 
to  each  participating  family.  If  families  cannot  meet  their 
mortgage  obligations  during  the  construction  period,  unmet 
payments  can  be  added  to  the  principal  outstanding  balance  of  the 
loan. 
Previous  research  on  the  FmHA  Section  502  program 
The  most  comprehensive  examination  of  the  Section  502 
program  was  undertaken  by  the  Housing  Assistance  Council  (HAC 
1988).  HAC  found  the  program  to  be  a  cost  effective  means  of 
extending  home  ownership  opportunities  to  low  income  households. 
In  spite  of  an  overall  favorable  evaluation  of  the  program,  HAC 
identified  certain  problematic  aspects  that  are  relevant  to  the 
present  study. 
First,  HAC  concluded  that  the  subsidy  phase  out  mechanisms 
in  the  Section  502  program  posed  problems  to  borrowers.  The 
phasing  out  is  gradual  until  income  rises  above  a  certain 
threshold,  which  is  generally  fixed  at  some  amount  above  80 
percent  of  area  median  income.7  This  ceiling  is  low  enough  that 
once  it  is  reached,  20%  of  borrower's  income  is  still 
insufficient  to  cover  shelter  expenses.  Nevertheless,  once  the 
7For  the  period  under  study,  1981-1986,  this  threshold  was 
set  at  an  average  of  $5,500  above  80  percent  of  area  median 
income. ceiling  is  reached,  slight  increases  in  income  produce  a  sharp 
payment  increase. 
borrower's  income 
income  to  receive 
Second,  HAC 
In  addition,  once  the  subsidy  is  phased  out,  a 
12 
has  to  fall  below  80  percent  of  area  median 
subsidy  again. 
found  that  poverty  level  borrowers  had  better 
repayment  performance  than  other  borrowers  (HAC  1988).  HAC 
suggested  that  this  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  poverty  level 
borrowers  are  more  dependent  upon  transfer  payments  which  are 
steady  sources  a?  income.  In  contrast,  HAC  noted  that  l?w 
income,  but  non-poor,  borrowers  are  more  dependent  upon  earnings, 
which,  in  FmHa  sample.  tended  to  be  irregular  and  volatile. 
Finally,  HAC  identified  the  loss  of  borrower  income  as  the 
major  factor  affecting  poor  repayment  performance.  For  instance, 
HAC  found  that  in  19  of  31  delinquency  cases,  the  borrower's 
earnings  declined  or  disappeared  altogether.  In  4  cases,  the 
household  lost  a  wage  earner  through  divorce  and,  in  another 
case,  a  widow  lost  pension  payments  when  her  minor  son  turned  18. 
All  these  demographic  changes  appear  to  have  a  large  impact  on 
the  level  of  resources  available  to  borrowers. 
Because  HAC's  contentions  were  based  on  descriptive 
analyses,  it  is  not  possible  to  assess  the  real  impact  of  these 
issues  on  default  unless  they  are  evaluated  within  a  fully 
specified  multivariate  model.  The  methodology  used  to  test  HAC's 
empirical  contentions  as  well  as  the  theoretical  premises 





research  methodology  used  to  analyze  the  default 
. 
of  a  sample  of  low  income,  Section  502  borrowers  is 
presented  in  this  section.  Three  issues  are  discussed  in  some 
detail:  (1)  a  description  of  the  Section  502  panel  data,  (2)  a 
description  of  the  measures  included  in  the  analysis,  and  (3)  a 
description  of  the  proportional  hazard  estimation  used  in  the 
multivariate  analysis. 
The  oanel  data 
The  Section  502  panel  data  used  in  the  analysis  was 
collected  by  the  Housing  Assistance  Council  (HAC),  a  well-known 
non-profit,  rural  advocacy,  technical  assistance,  and  development 
organization,  based  in  Washington,  D.C.  The  panel  data  is  for  a 
cross  section  of  874  Section  502  borrowers  who  received  loans  in 
1981.*  HAC  followed  the  progress  of  these  borrowers  from  the 
time  of  loan  origination  (1981)  to  1987,  collecting  a  wide  range 
of  contemporaneous  data  on  families,  loans,  and  properties 
throughout  the  period.  The  sample  was  selected  in  three  steps: 
(1)  counties  were  selected  to  be  representative  of  counties 
nationwide  based  on  a  matrix  of  census  region,  metropolitan 
status,  racial  composition  and  incidence  of  poverty  in  each 
county:  (2)  FmHA  Offices  with  the  most  1981  loan  activity  in 
counties  in  each  of  the  matrix  groupings  were  selected  for 
* Some  borrowers  actually  received  their  loans  in  1982.  The 
original  data  set  contained  information  on  894  borrowers.  Twenty 
cases  were  dropped  from  the  study  due  to  missing  information. 14 
sampling;  and,  (3)  all  the  usable  loan  records  in  each  of  these 
offices  were  included  in  the  sample. 
The  clustering  used  in  the  survey  weighted  the  sample  in 
favor  of  areas  where  FmHA  was  both  active  in  home  loans,  i.e., 
had  the  largest  caseloads,  and  serving  very  low-income 
households.  The  exclusion  of  loans  from  offices  with  small  loads 
does  not  limit  the  overall  representativeness  of  the  sample 
because  offices  with  the  largest  caseloads  represented  the  bulk 
of  Section  502  activity.  %idence  of  this  representativeness  can 
be  derived  from  comparing  the  sample's  average  income  and  subsidy 
trends  with  those  of  all  FmHA  borrowers.  The  average  adjusted 
income  of  sample  borrowers  was  $9,333  compared  with  FmHA's  1981 
nationwide  average  of  $9,485.  Similarly,  subsidy  trends  among 
sample  borrowers  reflected  those  of  all  FmHA  borrowers  (HAC  1988, 
Pm  32).9 
Variables  and  measures 
The  data  set  contained  or  allowed  for  the  generation  of  all 
the  variables  necessary  in  the  analysis.  A  summary  of  the 
variables  and  measures  included  in  the  analysis  is  presented  in 
Table  1.  A  dichotomous  variable,  the  dependent  variable  was 
9 This  nationwide  representativeness  compares  favorably  with 
many  prior  studies  on  mortgage  risk.  For  instance,  Vandell  and 
Thibodeau  (1985)  used  450  conventional  loans  provided  by  a  single 
Dallas  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Association.  Other  researchers 
that  have  used  only  sub-national  data  sets  (state,  county,  and 
city-wide)  include  von  Furstenberg  (1969,  1970);  von  Furstenberg 
and  Green  (1974);  Williams  et  al.  (1974);  Sandor  and  Sosin 
(1975);  and  Morton  (1975). 15 
designed  to  capture  the  occurrence  of  default,  i.e.,  the  transfer 
of  the  property  title  to  the  lender  in  exchange  for  the 
cancellation  of  the  outstanding  debt.  Households  defaulted 
their  loans  if  one  of  the  following  occurred:  foreclosure, 
transfer  of  deed,  or  voluntary  conveyance. 
on 
A  number  of  independent  variables  suggested  by  theory  and 
prior  work  were  included  in  the  analysis.  First,  consistent  with 
the  bulk  of  the  default  literature,  a  measure  of  contemporaneous 
net  equity  was  construe?.?  d,  the  annual  loan  balance  to  house  J 
value  ratio  (LTV).  The  data  set  contained  loan  balance 
information  for  each  year  in  the  study  period  but  only  appraised 
house  value  information  at  time  of  loan  origination.  House  value 
information  for  all  other  years  was  estimated  by  adjusting  the 
appraised  value  to  reflect  annual  changes  in  the  regional 
consumer  price  index.  The  annual  LTV  measure  included  in  the 
multivariate  estimation  was  adjusted  to  reflect  the  value  of  the 
Section  502  recapture  provision.1° 
Second,  a  measure  of  a  borrower's  ability  to  pay  was  also 
included  in  the  analysis.  This  measure  was  constructed  as  the 
ratio  of  housing  costs  to  adjusted  household  income  (PTY).  The 
housing  costs  included  in  the  construction  of  this  ratio  were 
"Refer  to  Appendix  A  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
estimation  of  the  Section  502  recapture  provision. 16 
mortgage  principal  and  interest  payments,  and  annual  property 
taxes  and  home  owners  insurance  payments  (PITI)." 
Third,  informdtion  on  the  annual  subsidy  received  was  also 
included  in  the  analysis.12  The  effect  of  the  interest  credit 
on  mortgage  default  was  controlled  in  three  ways.  First,  the 
amount  of  subsidy  received  was  included  in  the  multivariate  model 
as  a  continuous  variable  (SUBSIDY).  This  allowed  for  an 
assessment  of  the  effect  of  the  magnitude  of  the  subsidy  received 
on  default.  Second,  a  dummy  variabl  c  identifying  borrowers  who 
received  the  maximum  subsidy  (MAXIMUM)  was  also  included  in  the 
model.  This  dummy  variable  was  included  to  assess  whether  these 
borrowers  have  a  pattern  of  default  different  from  other 
borrowers.  Third,  a  dummy  variable  identifying  borrowers  who 
received  interest  credit  at  origination  and  later  graduated  from 
the  subsidy  (ZEROSUB)  was  also  included.  This  dummy  variable  was 
"A  note  needs  to  be  made  about  this  measure  of  housing 
costs.  Although  in  theory  the  initial  PIT1  costs  in  the  section 
502  program  is  set  at  20  percent  of  household  income,  in  reality 
the  housing  expenditure  to  income  ratio  appears  to  be  more 
variable.  Among  our  sample  of  FmHA  section  502  participants,  the 
average  1981  PTY  ratio  was  24.3  percent  with  a  standard  deviation 
of  6.3  percent.  In  addition  to  the  variation  in  the  PTY  ratio 
at  the  time  of  loan  origination,  the  panel  nature  of  our  data  set 
allowed  for  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  variation  than  in  prior 
cross-sectional  default  studies. 
I2 Although  the  interest  credit  subsidy  could  be  considered, 
in  part,  a  limitation  to  the  generalizability  of  the  study  to 
non-program  participants,  some  implications  can  be  drawn  beyond 
those  pertaining  to  the  section  502  program.  This  is  because 
borrowers  who  received  the  maximum  subsidy  initially  had  no 
buffer  against  unexpected  declines  in  income  and  thus  may  have 
reacted  to  income  changes  as  borrowers  do  when  they  hold 
mortgages  from  private  lenders  (about  28  percent  of  the  sample, 
250  borrowers,  received  the  maximum  subsidy  at  the  time  of  loan 
origination). 17 
included  to  assess  whether  these  borrowers  exhibited  a  higher 
risk  of  default  than  borrowers  who  continued  to  receive  subsidy. 
In  addition  to  these  interest  credit  variables,  two  other 
program  variables  were  included  in  the  analysis.  These  variables 
are  size  of  loan  at  origination  (LOAN)  and  a  dummy  variable 
denoting  those  who  built  new  homes  (BUILT)  either  through 
participation  in  the  self-help  program  or  through  contracted 
construction. 
Finally,  a  number  of  control  variables  suggested  by  prior 
work  were  also  included  in  the  analysis.  Borrower  related 
factors  include  gender  (FEMALE),  race  (MINORITY),  changes  in 
household  composition  (separation,  divorce  and  widowhood) 
(MARITAL),  change  in  the  number  of  dependents  (LESSKIDS),  and  the 
ratio  of  transfer  income  (AFDC,  SSI,  disability,  pension,  and 
child  support)  to  total  adjusted  household  income  (TRNINC). 
Proportional  hazard  model 
Hazard  methodology  is  ideally  suited  to  analyze  default. 
The  questions  addressed  here  relate  to  discrete  transitions  made 
by  borrowers.  The  transition  is  default  on  the  mortgage.  In 
particular,  we  are  interested  in  determining  which  factors  exert 
strong  effects  on  the  likelihood  of  default.  For  the  purpose  of 
this  study,  how  program  characteristics  relate  to  the  likelihood 
of  default  is  also  a  major  focus.13 
13See  Quercia  and  Stegman  (1992)  for  a  discussion  of 
proportional  hazard  models  in  the  study  of  mortgage  default. 18 
The  Cox  proportional  hazard  model  used  in  the  analysis  is 
based  on  the  hazard  rate  function.  This  function  depicts  the 
risk  of  an  event  occurring  at  any  instant.  In  the  models 
estimated,  the  event  is  mortgage  default. 
Probability  of  default  between  times  t  and  t+At 
h(t) = _______------______--~---~~~-~~~~~------~~~~~~~~~---- 
(A t)(Probability  of  default  after  time  t) 
=  h,  (t)  ,W+.  - .+BkXk 
The  function  h,(t)  is  called  the  baseline  hazard  function. 
This  can  have  any  shape.  The  proportional  hazard  specification 
compares  the  probability  of  default  within  an  interval  to  the 
probability  of  default  outside  the  interval.  Since  both 
probabilities  depend  on  the  baseline  rate,  it  cancels  out  in  the 
numerator  and  denominator. 
While  this  specification  implies  a  continuous-time  hazard 
rate,  the  particular  functional  form  estimated  is  in  discrete 
time.  For  this,  it  is  assumed  that  the  hazard  rate  is  constant 
within  discrete  time  intervals.  The  hazard  ratio  can  vary  in 
discrete  jumps  from  interval  to  interval  given  changes  in  the 
values  of  the  covariates.14  The  unit  of  time  measurement  is 
14The  model  with  time-varying  covariates  used  in  the 
analysis  should  be  distinguished  from  the  standard  proportional 
hazards  model  which  estimates  the  hazard  rate  based  on  the  value 
of  a  covariate  which  is  assumed  to  remain  constant  over  time.  It 
should  also  be  distinguished  from  models  with  time-dependent 
covariates.  In  these  models,  covariates  are  assumed  to  vary  over 
the  relevant  period  as  a  function  of  time.  The  time-varying 
covariates  model  allows  for  discrete  changes  in  the  value  of 
covariates  which  are  assumed  to  remain  constant  within  specific 19 
months  with  discrete  jumps  taken  at  yearly  intervals  as  the 
payment  schedule  is  calculated. 
The  results  of  the  multivariate  estimation  of  the  Cox 
proportional  hazard  model  are  reported  in  the  next  section. 
Results  of  empirical  analysis 
Descriotion  of  the  Sample 
Table  2  describes  the  sample  of  874  households  used  in  the 
ana!.ysis.  Over  the  1981-1986  period,  9  perchznt  of  the  sample 
defaulted  on  their  loans.  A  more  detailed  breakdown  of  defaulted 
loans,  also  presented  in  Table  2,  indicates  that  of  these  81 
loans,  13  loans  were  terminated  by  foreclosure,  in  22  cases  a 
transfer  of  deed  in  lieu  of  foreclosure  occurred,  and  46 
borrowers  voluntarily  conveyed  the  title  of  the  property  back  to 
FmHA  in  exchange  for  the  extinction  of  the  outstanding  mortgage 
debt. 
The  distribution  of  key  variables  is  presented  in  Table  3. 
First,  the  average  loan-to-value  ratio  (LTV)  at  time  of  loan 
origination  was  96.3  percent.  As  expected,  the  mean  LTV  declined 
by  about  22.9  percent  over  the  study  period.  This  decline, 
however,  does  not  reflect  the  subsidy  recapture  provision  in  the 
program,  which  affects  the  ratio  over  time.  When  this  provision 
is  taken  into  account,  the  mean  1986  LTV  was  130  percent,  a  35 
percent  increase  over  1981. 
periods  of  time  within  the  larger  duration  studied. 20 
A  second  key  variable  presented  in  Table  3  is  the  payment  to 
adjusted  household  income  ratio  (PTY).  The  mean  PTY  at  time  of 
loan  origination  was  24.3  percent.  That  is,  the  average  borrower 
spent  about  a  quarter  of  his/her  adjusted  household  income  to  pay 
for  mortgage  principal  and  interest  payments,  property  taxes,  and 
insurance.  Over  the  study  period,  the  mean  PTY  increased  to  34 
percent,  a  40  percent  increase.  This  increase  shows  how  rapidly 
increasing  property  taxes  and  insurance  premiums  may  pose 
particularly  di fficult  burdens  for  many  low  income  borr-wers. 
Three  variables  were  included  to  capture  different  aspects 
of  the  subsidy  received.  First,  the  average  interest  credit  at 
time  of  loan  origination  was  $2,042.15  The  1986  average  subsidy 
was  $2,422,  a  18.6  percent  increase  in  real  terms  over  the  study 
period.  This  increase  suggests  that  the  income  of  many  borrowers 
did  not  increase  as  fast  as  the  increase  experienced  in  housing 
expenditures.  Second,  the  dummy  variable  MAXIMUM  indicates  that 
29.2  percent  of  the  sample  received  the  maximum  subsidy  at  the 
time  of  loan  origination.16  Over  the  study  period,  the  average 
annual  number  of  borrowers  receiving  the  maximum  subsidy  went 
down  by  more  than  41  percent,  to  17.2  percent  of  the  sample. 
Third,  the  variable  ZEROSUB  indicates  that  17.7  percent  of  the 
borrowers  who  received  an  interest  credit  at  loan  origination  had 
15All  dollar  figures  in  this  section  are  in  1990  dollars. 
I6 The  maximum  subsidy  was  an  interest  credit  that  reduced 
the  effective  interest  rate  paid  by  borrowers  to  1  percent. 21 
their  subsidy  phased  out  due  to  increases  in  adjusted  household 
income  over  the  study  period. 
Table  3  also  presents  the  distribution  of  other  economic 
variables  included  in  the  model.  Among  these  variables,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  average  borrowers  experienced  an 
increase  in  annual  adjusted  income  of  almost  25  percent  in  real 
terms,  from  $13,367  to  $16,596  in  1986  (INCOME).  During  the  same 
period,  the  proportion  of  income  represented  by  transfer  payments 
declined  by  mo:e  than  9  percent  (TRNINC). 
In  spite  of  a  low  1981  income,  the  average  borrower  was  able 
to  purchase  a  home  appraised  at  $56,126  (APPRAISED)  and  to  obtain 
a  $53,583  loan  (LOAN).17  This  was  possible  due  to  the  deep 
subsidy  provided  by  the  program.  The  average  borrower  paid  an 
effective  interest  rate  (RATE)  of  2.5  percent  in  1981  (compared 
to  market  rates  of  about  13  percent).  Over  the  1981-86  period, 
the  average  effective  rate  paid  by  borrowers  increased  by  154 
percent,  from  about  2.5  to  6.3  percent,  reflecting  the  fact  that, 
on  average,  as  borrowers  improved  their  financial  situation 
their  subsidy  declined. 
Finally,  the  demographic  characteristics  of  the  borrowers 
are  also  presented  in  Table  3.  Most  of  the  borrowers  were 
married  couples  (FAMILY),  59.2  percent,  or  single  female  heads  of 
households  (FEMALE),  33.2  percent.  Most  of  the  borrowers  were 
nonminorities,  only  one  in  every  eight  was  an  African  American 
171t  is  interesting  to  note  than  more  than  one  in  every 
three  borrowers  built  their  own  home,  either  through  a  contractor 
or  self  help  (BUILD). 22 
borrower  (MINORITY).  Although  changes  in  household  composition 
among  borrowers  occurred  during  the  1981-86  period,  the  incidence 
of  such  changes  was  not  widespread:  (1)  13.3  percent  of 
borrowers  who  were  married  at  loan  origination  either  divorced, 
separated  or  were  widowed  over  the  study  period  (MARITAL),  and 
(2)  18.2  percent  of  borrowers  who  had  children,  age  18  or 
younger,  at  time  of  loan  origination  lost  a  dependent  over  the 
study  period  (LESSKIDS). 
Multivariate  Analvsis 
The  results  of  two  multivariate  proportional  hazard 
estimations  are  presented  in  Tables  4  and  5.18  The  first  model, 
Table  4  includes  the  variables  suggested  by  prior  work,  the 
variables  capturing  the  main  characteristics  of  the  Section  502 
program,  and  three  key  demographic  variables.  The  second  model, 
Table  5,  includes  a  number  of  key  demographic  variables.19 
18The  coefficients  (betas)  were  estimated  in  the  regression. 
The  relative  risk  or  hazard  ratio  of  a  change  in  a  covariate  is: 
,01x1+.  . +pj(XjAj)+..@kXk  /eBlxl  +..+fljXj+..fikXk, eBjAXj 
Typically,  hazards  ratios  are  reported  for  a  one  unit  change 
in  the  covariate.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  meaning:  a  one 
unit  increase  in  the  covariate  for  a  specific  interval  will 
increase  the  relative  risk  of  an  event  by  the  ratio  efi'.  A 
hazard  ratio  greater  than  one  indicates  an  increased  probability 
of  default  given  an  increase  in  the  covariate.  In  contrast,  a 
hazard  ratio  less  than  one  indicates  a  decreased  probability  of 
default.  The  t-ratio  is  interpreted  in  the  standard  fashion. 
The  sign  of  the  t-ratio  also  indicates  the  direction  of  the 
effect. 
19Given  that  the  number  of  borrowers  who  defaulted  is  81  and 
the  10  observations  per  variable  rule  of  thumb,  no  more  than 
eight  or  nine  variables  could  be  included  in  the  estimation  at 
any  given  time. 23 
Model  1  -  the  fullv  snecified  model 
Contrary  to  prior  work,  loan  to  value  ratio  (LTV)  was  found 
to  have  no  significant  effect  on  default.  This  lack  of 
significance  was  consistent  in  a  number  of  alternative 
specifications  of  the  model.  In  contrast,  the  payment  to  income 
ratio  (PTY)  exhibited  a  consistent  significant  positive  effect  on 
default.  Households  that  experienced  a  1  percent  increase  in 
this  ratio  were  found  to  be  1.2  times  more  likely  to  default  than 
other  households.*' 
The  effect  of  the  Section  502  program  subsidy  on  default  is 
also  presented  in  Table  4.  Consistent  with  the  goals  of  the 
program,  the  interest  credit  (SUBSIDY)  was  found  to  have  a 
significant  negative  effect  on  default.  Borrowers  who  received 
the  maximum  subsidy  at  the  time  of  loan  origination  (MAXIMUM) 
were  not  more  likely  to  default  in  later  years  than  other 
borrowers.  Borrowers  who  received  an  interest  credit  at  loan 
origination  and  later  had  their  subsidy  phased  out  due  to 
increases  in  adjusted  household  income  (ZEROSUB)  were  more  likely 
to  default  than  other  borrowers.  On  average,  these  borrowers 
were  2.3  times  more  likely  to  default  than  other  borrowers. 
The  effects  of  other  program  variables  on  the  default 
decision  are  also  presented  in  Table  4.  First,  consistent  with 
prior  work,  the  magnitude  of  the  loan  (LOAN)  was  found  to  be 
*'Several  alternative  specifications  of  Model  1  were 
estimated  to  assess  the  effect  that  changes  in  property  taxes  and 
insurance  payments  had  on  default.  Findings  were  consistent  in 
indicating  that  increases  in  these  expenditures  are  not 
associated  with  a  higher  likelihood  of  default  over  time. 24 
positively  correlated  with  default  risk.  Second,  of  particular 
importance,  is  the  fact  that  borrowers  who  build  their  own  homes, 
either  through  a  contractor  or  self  help  (BUILD),  were  found  to 
be  less  likely  to  default  than  other  households.  This  may 
indicate  that  borrowers  who  invest  something  personal  in  their 
homes  are  less  likely  to  walk  away  when  confronted  with 
difficulties. 
Finally,  the  effects  of  three  demographic  variables  on 
default  are  also  presented  in  Table  4.  Borrowers  who  experienced 
a  change  in  marital  status  (MARITAL),  i.e,  divorce,  separation  or 
widowhood,  were  found  to  be  more  likely  to  default  than  other 
borrowers.  On  average,  experiencing  changes  in  marital  status 
increases  the  risk  of  default  about  4.5  times.  Similarly, 
borrowers  who  had  children,  age  18  or  younger,  at  time  of  loan 
origination  and  had  children  move  out  over  the  study  period 
(LESSKIDS)  were  found  to  exhibit  a  higher  risk  of  default  than 
other  borrowers.  On  average,  these  borrowers  were  found  to  be 
almost  twice  as  likely  to  default  as  other  borrowers.  In 
contrast,  the  proportion  of  household  income  that  came  from 
transfer  payments  (TRNINC)  was  found  to  have  no  effect  on  default 
decisions. 
Before  discussing  the  implications  of  this  and  other 
findings,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  impact  of  demographic 
variables. 25 
Model  2  - The  Demosraohic  Model 
In  addition  to  the  two  variables  suggested  by  prior  work, 
LTV  and  PTY,  a number  of  demographic  characteristics 
traditionally  considered  risky  were  included  in  the  model  in 
Table  5.  Contrary  to  stereotypes,  African  American  borrowers 
(MINORITY)  were  found  to  exhibit  a  lower  risk  of  default  than 
non-minority  borrowers.  Also,  borrowers  who  were  female  heads  of 
households  and  married  couples  at  origination  were  found  to 
exhibit  a  lower  risk  of  default  than  those  who  were  single  male 
heads  of  households. 
Consistent  with  the  findings  in  Table  4,  borrowers  who 
experienced  changes  in marital  status  (MARITAL)  or  a  reduction  in 
the  number  of  dependents  living  at  home  (LESSKIDS)  were  found  to 
have  a higher  risk  of  default  than  other  borrowers.  Also 
consistent  with  prior  findings,  the  effects  of  these  variables  on 
default  risks  is  greater  than  those  of  variables  capturing  equity 
(LTV)  or  ability  to  pay  (PTY)  considerations. 
Unlike  the  findings  in  Table  4,  however,  larger  ratios  of 
transfer  income  to  total  adjusted  household  income  (TRNINC)  were 
found  to  be  associated  with  lower  default  risks. 
Discussion  and  implications  of  the  findings 
The  discussion  of  the  study  findings  is  divided  into  two 
sections,  the  implications  of  the  findings  for  the  default 
literature  and  for  the  FmHA  Section  502  program. 26 
Implications  of  the  findinss  for  the  default  literature 
In  this  paper,  we  have  examined  the  effect  of 
contemporaneous  borrower,  property,  and  loan  characteristics  on 
the  default  decision  of  a  sample  of  lower  income,  subsidized 
rural  borrowers.  Contrary  to  prior  work,  contemporaneous  home 
equity,  captured  by  the  variable  loan  to  value  ratio,  was  found 
to  have  no  effect  on  default.  This  lack  of  effect  may  be  due  to 
the  fact  that  this  measure  of  equity  was  estimated  using  regional 
indexes  that  may  not  reflect  the  characteristics  of  local  housing 
markets.  An  alternative  explanation  for  this  lack  of  effect  is 
the  fact  that  sample  borrowers  faced  high  transaction  costs  if 
default  occurred  due  to  the  extra  benefits  derived  from 
participating  in  the  FmHA  Section  502  program. 
The  central  empirical  finding  of  this  study  is  the 
significant  effect  of  mortgage  payment  to  income  ratio  on  the 
default  decision.  This  is  contrary  to  the  findings  of  prior 
work.  The  use  of  panel  data  in  the  analysis  may  have  allowed  a 
better  estimation  of  the  role  of  borrower-related  factors, 
especially  changes  in  household  income  and  the  occurrence  of 
crisis  events,  on  the  default  decision.  This  is  the  first  time 
that  such  borrower  related  panel  information  has  been  used  in  a 
default  study. 
A  second,  key  finding  is  that  borrower  characteristics 
traditionally  considered  risky  were  found  to  exhibit  no 
significant  effect  on  default.  Of  particular  importance  is  the 
finding  that  being  a  minority  or  a  female  headed  household  is  not 27
associated with higher default risk. Denying loans to these
potential borrowers, or charging them interest premiums to
compensate for the 'excessive risk commonly believed such
demographic characteristics represent, is not appropriate
on the findings.
based
Obviously, these implications may be highly conditioned by
the characteristics of the  FmHA  Section 502 program. As other
panel data become available, the significance of the mortgage
payment to income ratio and the importance  nT  borrower related
factors, such as demographic characteristics traditionally
considered risky, need to be examined among unsubsidized
borrowers.
Imolications  of the findinas for the  FmHA  Section 502  Program
Overall, the study findings suggest that the  FmHA  Section
502 program is working as it should. Specifically, the program's
main aspect, the interest credit, seems to minimize default risk
for the average program participant. Even for those borrowers
who received the maximum subsidy at origination, and who had to
pay out of pocket any increases in housing expenditures over
time, the program seemed to minimize default risks.
In contrast, the findings indicate that the subsidy phase
out mechanism in the program needs to be reconsidered. Borrowers
who received a subsidy at loan origination and later had their
subsidy phased out due to increases in household income were
found to exhibit a higher risk of default than other borrowers.The  way  the  subsidy  is  phased  out  put  people 
the  threshold,  a  small  increase  in  household 
sharp  increases  in  housing  expenditures  (HAC 
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at  risk  because,  at 
income  produces 
1988).  Conversely, 
there  has  to  be  a  substantial  decline  in  household  income  for  the 
borrower  to  receive  a  subsidy  again.  These  findings  are 
consistent  with  HAC's  contention  that  borrowers  had  problems  with 
this  aspect  of  the  program  (HAC  1988). 
Also  consistent  with  HAC*s  contentions,  study  findings  show 
that  poverty  level  borrowers  have  good  repayment  performance. 
HAC  attributed  this  good  performance  to  the  reliance  of  poverty 
level  borrowers  on  transfer  income,  which  tends  to  be  less 
variable  thanother  sources  of  income.  Although  the  percentage 
of  household  income  that  comes  from  transfer  payments  exhibits  a 
significant  negative  effect  on  default  in  the  demographic  model 
presented  in  Table  5,  it  does  not  exhibit  a  significant  effect  in 
the  more  fully  specified  model  in  Table  4.  This  difference  may 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  model  in  Table  4  includes  several 
variables  that  captured  the  flexibility  of  the  program  subsidy, 
which  is  dependent  on  variations  in  household  income. 
Finally,  although  the  program  seems  to  be  effective  in 
minimizing  default  risk  resulting  from  financial  factors,  the 
program  does  not  address  default  risks  that  result  from  non- 
financial  considerations.  The  occurrence  of  crisis  events,  such 
as  marital  dissolution,  appear  to  have  strong  consistent  effects 
on  default,  even  when  financial  considerations  are  taken  into 
account.  This  suggests  the  need  to  build  into  the  program  some 29 
type  of  early  detection/referral  service  that  would  make 
counseling  available  to  borrowers  at  risk. 
Overall,  the  study  findings  are  consistent  with  HAC's 
conclusion  that  the  Section  502  program  is  a well  designed  low 
income  home  ownership  initiative.  However,  given  the  positive 
effect  of  the  subsidy  phase  out  mechanism  on  default,  a more  in 
depth  examination  of  this  and  other  program  characteristics  is 
needed. 30 
APPENDIX  A.  FmHA  SECTION  502  RECAPTURE  PROVISION 
The  unpaid  balance  of  loans  being  liquidated  by  sale  or 
transfer  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  unpaid  principal  and  interest, 
and  a  share  of  the  subsidy.  An  example  of  the  estimation  of  the 
unpaid  loan  balance  of  a  loan  being  terminated,  including  the 
subsidy  recapture  calculation,  is  presented  in  Table  A.l. 
The  amount  of  the  subsidy  to  be  repaid  by  the  borrower  is 





The  market  value  of  the  property  is  the  selling  price. 
Appraised  value  is  used  if  FmHa  County  Supervisor  believes 
that  the  reported  selling  price  is  substantially  below  the 
real  property  value.  For  instance,  if  the  appraised  value 
is  5  percent  or  more  above  the  reported  selling  price,  the 
estimation  of  the  subsidy  recapture  is  based  on  the 
appraised  value  rather  than  on  the  reported  selling  price. 
The  subsidy  is  recaptured  from  the  real  estate  mortgaged  and 
not  from  any  personal  assets. 
As  long  as  the  borrower  owns  and  occupies  the  property, 
he/she  can  pay  off  the  mortgage  and  defer  the  payment  of  any 
subsidy  recapture  until  the  property  is  conveyed  or  no 
longer  occupied. 
The  subsidy  recapture  is  net  of  transaction  costs  including 
sales  commissions,  advertising 
and  related  costs  such  as  deed 
taxes. 
costs,  appraisal  fees,  legal 
preparation  and  transfer e.  The  original  equity  is  considered  to  be  a percent  of  the 
market  value  of  the  property.  The  percent  is  determined  by 
dividing  the  o'riginal  equity  by  the  market  value  of  the 
31 
property  when  the  loan  was  closed. 
f.  The  borrower  receives  the  original  equity,  the  amount  of 
principal  paid,  and  any  value  appreciation,  less  any  subsidy 
to  be  repaid  or  recaptured. 
g*  The  subsidy  to  be 
the  mortgage  loan 
h.  The  subsidy  to  be 
granted,  i.e.  the 
repaid  is  based  on  the  number  of  months 
was  outstanding. 
repaid  is  based  on  the  amount  of  subsidy 
effective  interest  rate  paid  by  the 
borrower.over  time. 
The  actual  subsidy  to  be  repaid 
the  last  two  factors:  the  length  of 
average  effective  interest  rate  paid 
percentage  of  subsidy  received  to  be 
two  factors. 
by  the  borrower  varies  with 
residence  (g)  and  the 
(h)  -  Table  A.2  presents  the 
repaid  based  on  the  these TABLE  A.1 
EXAMPLE  OF THE ESTIMATION  OF UNPAID  LOAN  BALANCE 












ESTIMATION  OF DEBT  SERVICE 
YEAR  1 
POB  $31,400 
Note rate  12% 
Pay due  $3,843 
Int. pay  $3,768 
Print. pay  $75 
ESTIMATION  OF SUBSIDY 
Pay due 
note rate 




-20%  inc. 
SUBSIDY. 1 







YEAR  2  YEAR  3 
$31,325  $3 1,242 
12%  12% 
$3,843  $3,843 
$3,759  $3,749 
$84  $94 
YEAR  2 
$3,843 
YEAR  3 
$3,843 















































$1,863 TABLE  A.1 
EXAMPLE  OF  ESTIMATION  OF  UNPAID  LOAN  BALANCE 
AND  SUBSIDY  RECAPTURE 
ESTIMATION  OF  SUBSIDY  (continued) 
Loan  $31,400  $31,400  $31,400  $31,400  $31,400  $31,400 
Pay  at  12%  $3,843  $3,843  $3,843  $3,843  $3,843  $3,848 
-Pay  at  1%  $1,118  $1,118  $1,118  $1,118  $1,118  $1,118 
SUBSIDY  2  $2,725  $2,725  $2,725  $2,725  $2,725  $2,725 
Because  Subsidy  1 is  smaller,  borrower  receives  Subsidy  1 during  all  years, 
ESTIMATION  OF  EFFECTIVE  RATE  PAID  BY  BORROWER 
Pay  w/sub. 
Effec.  rate 
$1,723  $1,833  $2,162  $2,382  $2,549  $2,673 
4.04%  4.52%  5.89%  6.77%  7.41%  7.87% 
Because  the  borrower’s  payment  with  the  subsidy  is  less  than  interest  payments  at  note  rate  (above), 
borrower  pays  off  no  principal. 
ESTIMATION  OF  UNPAID  INTEREST 
Int.  pay 
@  12% 





$1,723  $1,833  $2,162  $2,382  $2,549  $2,673 
$2,045  $1,926  $1,587  $1,355  $1,177  $1,038 TABLE  A.1 
EXAMPLE  OF ESTIMATION  OF UNPAID  LOAN  BALANCE 
AND  SUBSIDY  RECAPTURE 
ESTIMATION  OF UNPAID  BALANCE  AND  SUBSIDY  RECAPTURE 
Sale  price  $34,683 
less unpaid  price 




(no  sales costs  am assumed) 
Conventional  loan  to value 
Loan  to value  w/recapture 
$3 1,400/$34,683 
($3 1,400+$9,128)/$34,683 
There  is no equity  left  for  the borrower. 
There  is no value  appreciation. 
Original  equity 
Percent  equity  at origination 
$1,600 
4.85%. 
Value  appreciation  $0 
Factor  from  Table  A.2 
(72 months,  6.08%  effective  rate)  0.21 
Value  appreciation  to government 
($0*0.21)  $0 (the lesser) 
Total  subsidy  granted  $13,795 
90.53% 
181.07% 
Government  and  borrower  get nothing  from  value  appreciation. 











FmHA  SECTION 502 PROGRAM 
PERCENT OF  SUBSIDY  RECAPTURE  BY  LENGTH  OF RESIDENCE 









Average Effective  Interest Rate Paid by Borrower 
l.l-2%  2.1-3%  3.1-4%  4.1-5%  5.1-6%  6.1-7% 
0.68  0.60  0.51  0.44  0.32  0.22 
0.66  0.58  0.49  0.42  0.31  0.21 
0.63  0.56  0.46  0.40  0.30  0.20 
0.56  0.49  0.42  0.36  0.26  0.18 
0.51  0.46  0.38  0.33  0.24  0.17 
0.45  0.40  0.34  0.29  0.21  0.14 









Source: HAC  1987. p.48. 35 
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